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Abstract
This study draws on concepts from political and risk communication to inform
our understanding of what motivates people to be politically active. Inspired by concerns
that traditional models of participation do not perform as well among younger and more
diverse populations (e.g. Bennett, 2008), alternate variables are considered including risk
perceptions surrounding policy issues and political parties. Results show that established
political variables such as political interest and civic duty remain strongly associated with
participation, while offering support for several new variables of interest from the risk
communication literature. In the present study, threat and efficacy perceptions explained
additional variance in political participation when added to known predictors of
participation.
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Introduction and Literature Review
Risks are an inevitable part of life. While some risks exist at the level of the
individual, many of the risks we experience exist at a societal level. From traffic
accidents to earthquakes to climate change, addressing these shared risks is achieved, in
part, through political action (Koski, 2010; May, 1991; Moser & Dilling, 2011). Two
branches of the field of communication focus on understanding perceptions of these
shared risks: risk communication and political communication. Broadly speaking, risk
communication scholars study how people perceive risks, and how best to design and
disseminate messages that promote risk awareness and inspire people to take action
(Lundgreen & McKaien, 2013; Moser & Dilling, 2011; Ruhrmann, 2008). Political
communication scholars study how public perception of issues translates into public
opinion, support for public policy, and political engagement (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008;
Ryfe, 2001). While risk and political communication typically focus on distinct
communication phenomena, integrations of concepts from these two fields—though
rare—indicate a potential for advances in our understanding of political participation (e.g.
Glasford, 2008; Hart & Feldman, 2016; O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999).
One of the ways in which publics can address risk, both at the individual and
societal levels, is through political participation (O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999). This
includes voting and other means of influencing the selection and decision-making of
government officials. As an example, scientists, scholars, and advocates agree that any
plan to address climate change must have a policy component (e.g. Hart & Feldman,
2016; Moser & Dilling, 2011; O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999). Through political
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participation, citizens can influence which shared risks are addressed by government and
how. Trends in electoral participation can offer some insight into who engages in political
participation and, thus, shapes the way shared risks are addressed. After decades of
steady decline, electoral participation in the United States increased considerably in the
2018 midterm and 2020 presidential elections (Campbell, 2006; Norris, 2015; Persily &
Stewart III, 2021). Whereas there has been long-standing concern about the engagement
of younger citizens in politics, turnout in 2018 and 2020 increased most sharply among
young voters (Cilluffo & Fry, 2019; Fabina, 2021). This abrupt reversal raises the need to
review known predictors of participation and consider new variables that can shed light
on who participates in politics and why.
Current models in political communication have identified some reliable
antecedents of voter participation, including demographics (Leighley & Nagler, 2013;
Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), political interest (Blais, 2000; Prior, 2010), political
efficacy (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Campbell, 2006; Craig, 1979; Shore, 2020), and
civic duty (Blais & Daost, 2020; Cambell, 2006; Delli Carpini, 2000; Riker &
Oldeshook, 1968). Similarly, current models in risk communication identify antecedents
to individual and collective risk mitigation behaviors, including risk perceptions (Witte,
1992), and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986; Witte, 1992).
While typically siloed, I offer that combining insights derived from both risk and
political communication may lead to a more holistic understanding of the variables
associated with risk-related political behavior. I measured variables from both fields that
are known predictors of behavioral intention and investigated the relative importance of
each in predicting political participation. In what follows, I describe the variables known
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to affect political participation and adoption of preventative risk behaviors. I then discuss
how policy issues and political parties have been framed as risks to the general public. I
propose that individuals’ risk and efficacy perceptions offer additional insight into who
participates and why.
Political Communication
Who Participates in Politics
Understanding who doesn’t participate in politics begins with looking at who
does. In the present study, political participation refers to actions taken to influence the
selection or decisions of government actors. A prominent example of political
participation is voting. While the electorate has been steadily growing younger and more
diverse (Barroso, 2020), those who participate in politics remain disproportionately
white, wealthy, educated, and (relatively) old (Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Wolfinger &
Rosenstone, 1980). Though these demographic factors—particularly age, income, and
education—are among the strongest predictors of electoral participation (Brady, Verba, &
Schlozman, 1995; Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), there are
several other individual-level variables that are consistently included in turnout models,
including political interest, political efficacy, and civic duty. While some evidence
suggests that the resources and advantages that precede electoral participation also
influence who engages in other forms of participation (Best & Krueger, 2005), there is
some indication that alternate forms of political participation—particularly online—
attract younger and more diverse citizens (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009;
Best & Krueger, 2005; Omotayo & Folorunso, 2020).
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Political Interest. As a variable related to political behavior, interest is fairly
intuitive: people who are interested in politics participate in politics. Though the causal
pathway is somewhat unclear, political interest is commonly used to explain variance in
participation (Blais & Daoust, 2020; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Prior, 2010).
Literature suggests that political interest is a fairly stable, trait-like variable that develops
early in life. Though it can fluctuate in response to personal and situational factors, it
quickly rebounds to its long-term level (Prior, 2010).
Civic Duty. Blais (2000) describes civic duty as “an ethical judgement that voting
is right and not voting is wrong” (p. 93). He distinguishes civic duty from political
interest, claiming that the former is moral and represents a sense of what one ought to do
(Blais & Daoust, 2020). Citizens with a strong sense of civic duty often gain satisfaction
from electoral participation, regardless of the outcome. For this reason, Riker and
Oldeshook (1968) added it to their calculus of voting—a participation model that builds
on Downs’ (1957) rational choice model. Here, it offers an explanation for a problem that
continues to plague rational choice scholars: why do people participate in elections when
they know their vote is statistically inconsequential? Because civic duty is considered to
be an important antecedent to political and civic participation, fostering civic duty
through socialization and education is often recommended by scholars. Nevertheless,
there is a decreasing trend in civic duty, especially in recent generations.
Political Efficacy. Political efficacy refers to the subjective attitudes that inform
political behavior. The definition commonly used by scholars is “the feeling that
individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process…
It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen
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can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187).
Political efficacy comprises two dimensions: internal and external.
Internal Efficacy. Internal efficacy captures an individual’s evaluation of their
ability to participate in politics. This includes both a perception that the opportunity for
participation is accessible and a feeling of personal competence (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei,
1991). Internal efficacy is assumed to be a direct precursor to participation (Shore, 2020),
but also acts as a mediator. Research shows that internal efficacy mediates the
relationship between socio-economic factors and participation, as people who are more
educated and well-connected feel more confident in their ability to participate in politics
(Shore, 2020). This cuts the other way, as Marx and Nguyen (2016) find that the
depressive effects of poverty on participation are mediated by low internal efficacy.
Internal efficacy also helps explain the relationship between political knowledge and
participation. The mediating role of internal efficacy might be articulated as the
subjective evaluation of one’s political knowledge, or the feeling that one knows enough
to participate meaningfully in politics (Reichert, 2016).
External Efficacy. External efficacy measures perceptions of the responsiveness
of government to citizen influence attempts (Craig, 1979). That is, the extent to which
people believe that participation is a viable way to influence government officials. As
with internal efficacy, external efficacy has a direct relationship to participation (Rumbul,
2016) and also mediates the relationship between participation and individual-level
factors like wealth (Marx & Nguyen, 2018), education (Jackson, 1995), and social
capital. Abramson and Aldrich (1982) estimate that at least half of the decline in voter
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turnout between 1960 and 1980 can be attributed to a decline in external political
efficacy.
Consistent with this prior research, I offer the following hypothesis:
H1: Political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy predicts
political participation.
Why People Participate in Politics
In addition to understanding who participates, it is worthwhile to consider why
people participate. Campbell (2006) describes a continuum anchored by two perspectives
on civic and political involvement, dating back to the earliest conceptualizations of
democracy in the United States: one is that citizens are motivated to participate out of a
sense of duty, and the other is that they participate in order to advance their own interests.
Campbell (2006, p. 193) notes that interest-driven citizens “ask themselves: Do I need to
vote in this election to defend my interests?” A similar typology is offered by Bennett
(2008; Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009) who describes a shift in recent decades away from
a dutiful citizen paradigm, in which one votes out of a sense of civic duty, toward an
actualizing citizen paradigm characterized by involvement driven by interest in
“personally meaningful, lifestyle-related political issues” (Bennett, 2008, p. 20). Though
this is perhaps most visible among recent generations, not all actualizing citizens are
young. According to Bennett, the shift is, in part, a product of cultural changes that have
replaced group-based society with a network-based society—a change that has the
potential to affect people across generations.
A potential shortcoming, then, of communication efforts aimed at increasing
participation is an assumption that civic duty is still a primary motivator. This is not to
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say that fostering civic duty is not a worthwhile endeavor. Certainly, research shows that
a sense of civic duty is a powerful motivator for participation—not only in elections but
in other vital expressions of community and political involvement (Campbell, 2006).
However, there is a growing need to consider models that better account for actualizing
citizens. Bennett notes that actualizing citizens are characterized by a lack of trust in
traditional forms of participation (i.e. voting), an observation echoed in Delli Carpini’s
(2000) examination of civic disengagement. While these citizens may prefer alternate
forms of participation or forgo participation altogether, voting remains critical to the
legitimacy and health of our democracy (Campbell, 2006). In order to increase the
participation of actualizing citizens, we need to better understand their interests and
motivations.
Despite decades of research and numerous models that focus on or combine
individual, political, and contextual variables, there are persistent unexplained gaps in
what we know about political participation (Matsusaka & Palda, 1999). Studies
repeatedly highlight the need for future research to uncover more factors that affect
involvement, particularly among younger citizens (e.g. Glasford, 2008; Matsusaka &
Palda, 1999).
Risk Communication
Risk communication theory could provide additional insights by offering a new
way to think about political participation. For citizens who are keen to advance or protect
their interests, participation might be a means to that end. If failing to protect their
interests is recontextualized as a risk, then participation could be characterized as a
preventative risk behavior. The risk communication field is replete with strategies for
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understanding and promoting such behaviors (e.g. Azjen, 1991; Bandura, 1986; Bandura
2004; Witte, 1992). One concern central to risk communication is how individuals
process and react to fear appeal-based messaging (Leventhal, 1970; Rogers, 1975; Witte,
1992), as fear appeals are a common tactic used by risk communicators (Popova, 2012).
Appeals to fear are also a common tactic used in political communication, as partisan
actors attempt to associate the opposition with feared outcomes, or to change attitudes by
prompting viewers to critically process new information (Brader, 2006; Cryderman &
Arceneaux, 2010; Scheller, 2019). Given the potential to re-frame political involvement
as a risk mitigation behavior and the prevalence of fear appeals in both risk and political
communication, risk communication may offer additional insights that more holistically
explain participatory behavior.
The Extended Parallel Process Model
One fear appeal theory with components that align with political participation
variables is the extended parallel process model (EPPM; Witte, 1992). The EPPM grew
out of previous work attempting to explain the inconsistent success of fear appeals in
health communication. The earlier parallel process model (Leventhal, 1970) identified
two general responses to fear appeals: danger control—a primarily cognitive process—
and fear control—a primarily emotional process. As emphasis in the field shifted to
cognitive behavioral approaches, subsequent work on fear appeals focused on danger
control—particularly the elements and approaches that motivated cognitive appraisal of
fear inducing behavioral-change messages. Out of this work emerged the Protection
Motivation Theory (PMT; Rogers, 1975), which identified message characteristics that
led to adaptive or maladaptive responses to fear appeals. Incorporating Bandura’s (1986)
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notion of self-efficacy, Rogers proposed that only messages which successfully instilled a
confidence in the individual’s ability to perform the recommended action would lead to
message acceptance and adoption of the adaptive behavior. Despite decades of
subsequent research, however, these theories and models failed to produce consistent
empirical results. They could not reliably represent the role and interaction of the
variables, and overwhelmingly focused on danger control to the exclusion of fear control.
To address these deficiencies and inconsistencies, Witte (1992) developed the extended
parallel process model, claiming that threat perceptions and efficacy perceptions interact
to produce message acceptance and behavioral change.
Threat. Threat comprises two variables: severity and susceptibility. In order for
the fear appeal to have any effect, the individual must perceive that a threat exists—one
that is significant and relevant. Importantly, there is a distinction between message
characteristics that express these components and the perception of them by individual
message recipients. How a person evaluates the threat is determined by how severe they
perceive the threat to be and how personally susceptible they think they are.
Severity. In EPPM, severity of the threat is the magnitude of detrimental
consequences associated with the risk—the potential result of taking no action. As
applied in EPPM, severity refers to message characteristics designed to convey this
magnitude, while perceived severity is the attitude held by the intended audience. In a
health-related example, campaigns aimed at the risk of smoking might emphasize the
severity of outcomes such as lung cancer. In a public policy example, campaigns about
climate change have emphasized the severity of extreme weather events (Li, 2014).
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Susceptibility. Susceptibility is the personal relevance of the threat, or the
perceived likelihood that these consequences will be experienced by the individual
message recipient. For example, someone who smokes cigarettes infrequently may
perceive that their health risk is lower than a heavy smoker (low perceived susceptibility),
and so messages targeted at this user may emphasize their susceptibility. In a study about
perceptions of climate change, Li (2014) manipulated perceived susceptibility by using
news stories about either weather events in the country or in a remote part of the world.
Efficacy. With its origins in Bandura’s (1986) Social Cognitive Theory, efficacy
in risk communication refers to agentic cognitive appraisals. Witte’s (1992) original
model identified two efficacy dimensions: self-efficacy and response efficacy. Selfefficacy is a belief about personal agency—that is, the extent to which the individual
views themself as capable of producing desired effects and preventing undesired ones
(Bandura, 2000). Response efficacy is the confidence that the recommended behavior or
solution will adequately address the threat. Both dimensions have been shown to affect
attitudes and behaviors for risks such as pandemics (Barnett et al., 2009), sexually
transmitted diseases (Hong, 2011); and climate change (Feldman & Hart, 2014; Hart &
Feldman, 2016). Previous research found that combining response efficacy information
with internal and external political efficacy information in messages about climate
change increased intended political participation through increased hope (Feldman &
Hart, 2016).
Policy Issues
Consistent with the findings of risk communication practitioners, observations
about the individualized politics of actualizing citizens raises the possibility that
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motivations to participate should be examined at the issue level (Bennett, 2008). To test
the utility of this approach, I have selected two policy areas that have been framed in
terms of risk to individual and social well-being: climate change and social security.
Climate Change
Despite widespread agreement among the scientific and academic communities
that climate change is occurring, largely human-caused, and poses dire risks to the planet
and humanity (Dryzek, Norgaard, & Schlosberg, 2011), there is a persistent lack of
consensus among partisans and policymakers in the United States (Hart & Feldman,
2016; McCright & Dunlap, 2003). While much of the doubt is sowed intentionally by
special interests (Brulle, 2019; Dunlap & McCright, 2011), there are good reasons for the
public to experience mixed perceptions and understandings of the risks associated with
climate change (Jamieson, 2011). Much of the impact of climate change is not visible or
imminent to many people, particularly in the United States where wealth and
infrastructure shield us from the consequences of our contribution (Jamieson, 2011;
Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006). In addition to uncertainty over the causes and
implications of climate change, its rapid politicization has caused marked disagreements
over what, if anything, should be done to address it at the policy level (Dunlap &
McCright, 2011). While liberals and Democrats in government have proposed sweeping
measures to reduce emissions and invest in sustainable industry (e.g. H.R. 109),
conservatives and Republicans largely downplay the severity of climate change and
oppose policies designed to address it (Gerrard, 2016; Moser & Dilling, 2011).
Climate change is a threat multiplier (Abrahams, 2019), meaning that its
consequences are likely to add irreparable strain to existing fault lines and weaknesses in
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a society. Though outcome projections vary widely and depend on myriad factors,
scientists and researchers acknowledge that the United States is not invulnerable to
deleterious consequences such as drought, extreme weather events, and sea level rise,
which could result in food insecurity and significant internal migration (Feng,
Oppenheimer, & Schlenker, 2012; Smith & Gregory, 2013). The severity of potential
outcomes is known to scientists and reported by news media, but content analyses have
found that liberal-leaning outlets are more likely to include this information than
conservative-leaning outlets. In addition, though both liberal and conservative outlets
habitually divorce threat and efficacy information in their coverage of climate change,
conservative outlets are more likely to include negative efficacy information (Feldman,
Hart, & Milosevic, 2017). Based on predictions of the EPPM, differential perceptions of
threat and efficacy could have impacts on behavioral reactions. Given that climate change
is such a controversial policy issue, those reactions will arguably be reflected in political
participation. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:
H2: Severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy perceptions for
climate change predicts variance in political participation.
Social Security
Social Security is a government-run program that supports the economic security
of elderly citizens. It is funded by working citizens, who pay into the program with the
expectation that they will one day be able to draw from it themselves. Social security has
long been a popular program with a diverse base of support and is often cited as a policy
priority by liberal, moderate, and conservative citizens (Pew Research Center, 2019;
Sherman, 1989; Yang & Barrett, 2006). In recent years, however, confidence in the
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solvency of the program has decreased, with an increasing number of people—
particularly young people—doubting they will be able to rely on social security when
they retire (Parker, Morin, & Horowitz, 2019). These concerns are not unfounded. The
Social Security Administration (SSA), part of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) program, has long warned that program costs are due to exceed
income—an eventuality that has come to pass, as confirmed in their 2019 Annual Report
(SSA, 2019). For decades, politicians have been discussing reforms to social security.
Like climate change, the depletion of the funds has not been unanimously regarded as a
crisis (Yang & Barrett, 2006) and proposals to address the problem vary. While
Republican politicians have largely favored constriction of the program, Democrats have
pushed for expansions paid for through taxes on high-income earners (Biden, 2020; Yang
& Barrett, 2006).
Despite the importance of the program to a large number of citizens, little
research has been done on the antecedents of public attitudes toward social security and
social security reform (Yang & Barrett, 2006). Consistent with results of public opinion
research (e.g. Pew Research Center, 2019), Yang and Barrett (2006) determine that the
effect of political ideology on social security attitudes is insignificant. Instead they note
that self-interest, or social structural position, has a much stronger effect, with citizens
who are less secure being more likely to favor protection of social security as a policy
priority. Therefore, I offer the following hypothesis:
H3: Severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy perceptions for
social security predicts political participation.
Affective Polarization
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The political application of fear appeals extends beyond policy issues to frame
political actors and parties as a risk. There is a growing concern over the widening gap
between the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States. In addition to
markedly divergent political perspectives, members of the two parties increasingly report
a rancorous dislike for and distrust of one another (Dias & Lelkes, 2021; Iyengar, Lelkes,
Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019; Levendusky, 2013). The growing disparity
between how partisans feel about the in-party and the out-party is known as affective
polarization.
Research on affective polarization suggests that it may be driven by ideological
polarization (Dias & Lelkes, 2021; Iyengar et al., 2019) and partisan media exposure
(Iyengar et al., 2019; Levendusky, 2013). While a degree of disagreement over policy
and cultural issues is an inherent part of our political system, the way these differences
are communicated by partisan sources drives the negative affective response. Levendusky
(2013) describes partisan media as opinionated media, helping in-party members make
sense of political information through a shared ideology. He notes, however, that partisan
media often achieves this not just through explaining why the in-party is right, but by
focusing on why the out-party is wrong. This pronounced partisan slant leads viewers to
like and trust the out-party less and show less support for bipartisanship.
This effect is mirrored by the rhetoric of politicians, who have increasingly
emphasized the danger posed by their political opponents (Badger, 2020; Ball, 2016).
During the 2020 presidential election, for example, President Donald Trump was
repeatedly portrayed by liberals as “dangerous” (e.g. Cilliza, 2020) while conservatives
insisted that Democrats constituted the primary threat facing the country (e.g. Costa,
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Weigel, Sonmez, & Wagner, 2020). Public opinion polling during the campaign found
that a majority of voters on both sides of the political aisle believe that a victory by the
other party would result in “lasting harm to the nation” (Deane & Gramlich, 2020, para.
12). Given this evidence that political parties and actors are perceived as risks, it is
possible that political participation is driven in part by concerns about the agendas of
unfavored political parties and candidates. To investigate this, I offer the following
hypothesis:
H4: Political polarization and positive and negative perceptions of the Republican
and Democratic parties predicts variance in political participation.
To explore whether combining insights from political communication and risk
communication can increase understanding of the variance in political participation, I
offer the following research questions:
RQ1: Does the addition of EPPM variables (severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy,
response efficacy, and collective efficacy) regarding climate change to political variables
(political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy) explain additional
variance in political participation?
RQ2: Does the addition of EPPM variables (severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy,
response efficacy, and collective efficacy) regarding social security to political variables
(political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy) explain additional
variance in political participation?
RQ3: Does the addition of affective polarization variables (polarization, positive
and negative perceptions of the Democratic and Republican parties) to political variables
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(political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy) offer additional
predictive power for political participation?
Methods
Participants
Participants (n = 240) were recruited from the College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences at Portland State University. While most professors were able to offer extra
credit to their classes in exchange for participation, some were not. IRB approval was
obtained for both conditions and two identical versions of the survey were offered,
preceded by different informed consent forms to accommodate the two groups. Of the
240 responses, 188 received extra credit and 52 did not. Twenty-two responses were
more than 75% incomplete and so were excluded from analysis. The remaining
participants (n = 219) were mostly female (n = 122, 55.7%) and white (n = 117, 53.4%),
with a median age of 24 (M = 27.35, SD = 8.43). A majority of participants were
Democrats (n= 115, 52.5%) with liberal economic (n = 142, 67.6%) and social views (n
= 169, 77.2%). See Table 1 for more sample characteristics.
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Table 1.
Participant Characteristics
Highest Level of Education

n

%

Less than high school

1

0.5

High school graduate or GED

9

4.1

Some college

79

36.1

Associate’s (2-year) degree

87

39.7

Bachelor’s (4-year) degree

34

15.5

Graduate degree

9

4.1

Party Affiliation

n

%

Age

n

%

18 – 24

94

42.9

25 – 34

59

26.9

35 – 44

17

7.8

45 – 54

8

3.7

55 and older

3

1.4

Missing

38

17.3

Annual Household Income

n

%

Less than $10,000

22

10.0

Democratic

115 52.5

$10,000 – $19,999

32

14.6

Republican

12

5.5

$20,000 – $29,999

34

15.5

$30,000 – $39,999

18

8.2

Member of Another Party

24

11.0

$40,000 – $49,999

15

6.8

Unaffiliated

65

29.7

$50,000 – $59,999

21

9.6

Missing

3

1.4

$60,000 – $69,999

11

5.0

Economic Political Ideology

n

%

$70,000 – $79,999

5

2.3

Very Liberal

47

21.5

$80,000 – $89,999

7

3.2

Liberal

59

26.9

$90,000 – $99,999

9

4.1

Moderately Liberal

42

19.2

$100,000 or more

39

17.8

Moderate

42

19.2

Missing

6

2.7

Moderately Conservative

18

8.2

Race/Ethnicity

n

%

Conservative

5

2.3

American Indian or Alaska
Native

4

1.8

Very Conservative

2

0.9

Missing

4

1.8

Asian

26

11.9

Social Political Ideology

n

%

Black or African American

10

4.6

Hispanic or Latino

28

12.8

Very Liberal

81

37.0

Native Hawaiian or Pacific
Islander

1

0.5

Liberal

61

27.9

Moderately Liberal

27

12.3

White or Caucasian

121

55.2

Moderate

34

15.5

Multiracial or Biracial

15

6.8

Moderately Conservative

5

2.3

Prefer not to respond

14

6.4

Conservative

6

2.7

Gender

n

%

Very Conservative

2

0.9

Female

122

55.7

Missing

3

1.4

Male

80

36.5

Prefer not to respond

17

7.8
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Design
A survey design measured variables of interest from both political communication
and risk communication theories.
Recruitment and Data Collection
All recruitment was conducted remotely and at the discretion of the professors.
Methods varied by class and included a recorded video appeal from the author, a live
appeal made in remote classes, and email announcements. All students were directed to a
survey link shared electronically either by email or on the class page of the school’s
learning platform, D2L. Data collection began on February 11, 2021, and concluded on
March 12, 2021.
Measures
Dependent variable. The outcome variable was political participation. Risk
communication scholars identify behavioral intention as the strongest predictor of actual
behavior (Azjen, 1991; Azjen & Fishbein, 1977; Glasford, 2008). While some political
scholars caution against the use of intention as a reliable measure for electoral
participation, direct inquiry into this question using panel data has determined that there
is a strong correlation between intended and reported participation (Quintelier & Blais,
2016). Nevertheless, Quintelier and Blais (2016) also note that the intention–behavior
gap is larger for those with higher levels of political interest, education, and civic duty.
They caution that reported participation may be a more accurate measure when the goal
of a study is to estimate the magnitude of the effect of a set of variables on participation.
With this in mind, I measured both actual and intended participation. Two questions
measured past participation in (1) presidential and (2) midterm (congressional) elections.
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To capture forms of participation outside of voting, I adapted the measure of participation
used in the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2020 Pilot Survey. The original
measure asks about participatory behavior in the past 12 months; I instead asked about
likelihood of engaging in these behaviors in the upcoming 12 months. The measure
included 8 items with a 5-point response scale (extremely unlikely–extremely likely).
Sample behaviors include “join in a protest march, rally, or demonstration” and “post a
message or comment online about a political issue or campaign.” These 8 items were
combined with the two voting items and averaged to form a participation variable (𝛼 =
.84).
Political variables
Political interest. As recommended by Blais and Daoust (2020) and supported by
the findings of Prior (2018), political interest was measured with a single, direct question.
Participants rated their level of interest in national politics on a scale from 1 (“not at all
interested”) to 5 (“extremely interested”). See Table 2 for political variable means and
standard deviations.
Political efficacy. Two items each measured internal and external political
efficacy, taken from the ANES. Though measurement of political efficacy has been
inconsistent in the literature (Chamberlain, 2012; Morrell, 2003), the ANES measure is
often used by researchers in the United States. This measure has changed over the years,
which may contribute to the confusion over the optimal way to operationalize the
concepts. Correlation was used in place of reliability coefficients for these two-item
scales. As both were significant and moderate, new variables were created from the mean
of each pair of questions.
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To measure internal political efficacy, participants were asked, “How often do
politics and government seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s
going on?” and “How well do you understand the important political issues facing our
country?” (r = .47, p < .001) with 5-point response scales. To measure external political
efficacy, participants were asked the extent to which they agree or disagree with the
following statements on a 5-point scale: “People like me don’t have any say about what
the government does,” and “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think”
(r = .45, p < .001).
Civic duty. Following the recommendation of Blais and Galais (2016), a fouritem scale was used to measure civic duty (𝛼 = .73). The original study is designed to be
given over the phone, with varying response options (0–3 and 0–10), depending on the
question. In order to better fit the rest of the present survey, the question wording was
adapted to fit an agree–disagree scale. For example, a sample item from the original
scale, “How guilty would you feel if you did not vote in an election?” was reworded as “I
would feel guilty if I did note vote in an election”.
Table 2.
Political variables
n

M

Mdn

SD

𝛼

r

Political participation (Outcome)

219

2.96

3.0

0.92

.84

-

Political interest

218

3.43

3.0

1.12

-

-

Internal political efficacy

219

3.15

3.0

0.81

-

.47**

External political efficacy

219

2.85

3.0

0.97

-

.45**

.73

-

Variable

Civic duty
219
3.61
3.8
0.97
**Correlation between scale items is significant at the .01 level

Risk perception variables
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Policy issues. Risk perceptions were measured for each of the two policy issues—
climate change and social security. Variables from the extended parallel process model
(perceived severity, susceptibility, and response efficacy) were measured with an
adaptation of Witte, Cameron, McKeon, and Burkowitz’s (1996) Risk Behavior
Diagnosis Scale. These variables were measured with three questions each on a 5-point
agree–disagree scale. Sample questions included “Climate change is a significant threat”
(severity, CC 𝛼 = .97, SS 𝛼 = .96), “It is likely that I will be affected by extreme weather
events as a result of climate change” (susceptibility, CC 𝛼 = .79, SS 𝛼 = .76), and
“Political participation is an effective way to address climate change” (response efficacy,
CC 𝛼 = .83, SS 𝛼 = .81). In order to mitigate any priming effects, the order of these two
policy blocks was randomized. See Table 3 for means and scale reliabilities.
Political self-efficacy. The fourth variable in the extended parallel process model
is self-efficacy. A measure of political self-efficacy was taken from Caprara, Vecchione,
Capanna, and Mebane (2009). This 10-item, 5-point scale asks participants how capable
they feel to perform a range of behaviors related to political participation (not at all
capable–completely capable). Sample items include “State your own political opinion
openly, even in clearly hostile settings” and “Use the means you have as a citizen to
critically monitor the actions of your political representatives.” These items were
combined (𝛼 = .92), with the mean representing self-efficacy in both the climate change
and social security models.
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Table 3.
Risk perception variables
n

M

Mdn

SD

𝛼

Climate change severity

218

6.57

7.0

0.83

.97

Climate change susceptibility

218

5.07

5.0

1.34

.79

Climate change response efficacy

218

5.62

6.0

1.28

.83

Social security severity

219

5.81

6.0

1.23

.96

Social security susceptibility

219

5.17

5.0

1.22

.76

Social security response efficacy

218

5.07

5.0

1.18

.81

Political self-efficacy (5-point scale)

219

2.69

2.6

0.92

.92

Variable

Affective polarization. A measure of polarization was taken from Druckman and
Levendusky (2019), using two feeling thermometers. Participants were asked to rate their
feelings toward the Republican and Democratic Parties on scales ranging from 0
(cold/unfavorable) to 100 (warm/favorable). The score for the Democratic feeling
thermometer was subtracted from the Republican feeling thermometer, resulting in a raw
score for polarization. Regardless of sign, those who felt similarly about both parties had
a lower score. An interval scale was then constructed from this initial score, creating five
categories from 1 (-20 to 0 or 0 to 20) to 5 (-100 to -81 or 81 to 100), with higher scores
indicating more polarization.
Trait ratings. In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of participants’
perceptions of each party, a scale adapted from Druckman and Levendusky (2019) was
included to assess the traits they associate with the Republican and Democratic party.
Participants were asked how well a list of ten traits (five positive and five negative)
describe each party. To avoid priming effects, the order in which the parties were
presented was randomized. Druckman and Levendusky’s (2019) original instrument
contained eight traits (five positive and three negative). In the present study, two
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additional negative traits were added: dangerous and frightening. These additions were
intended to better capture whether participants perceive the two parties as potential risks.
Positive and negative trait ratings were created for each party by combining the five
items. See Table 4 for means and scale reliabilities.
Table 4.
Affective polarization variables
n

M

Mdn

SD

𝛼

Polarization

200

2.90

3.0

1.30

-

Positive traits Republican Party

215

2.16

2.0

0.80

.75

Negative traits Republican Party

215

3.89

4.0

0.93

.86

Positive traits Democratic Party

215

3.23

3.2

1.23

.77

Negative traits Democratic Party

213

2.45

2.2

1.18

.88

Variable

Results
A multiple linear regression was used to test H1. The model containing variables
of interest in political communication explained a statistically significant portion of the
variance in political participation, F(4, 213) = 30.83, p < .001, R

2
Adjusted

= .36. Political

interest (β = .51, t/213 = 8.11, p < .001) and civic duty (β = .21, t/213 = 3.55, p = .001)
explain a significant portion of the variance in political participation. Contrary to
previous work, neither internal (β = .02, t/213 = 0.34, p = .736) nor external (β = .04,
t/213 = 0.71, p = .478) political efficacy explain significant portions of the variance in
participation. Therefore H1 was partially supported.
Two multiple linear regressions were used to test whether risk communication
variables explain variance in political participation, based on perceptions of two different
policy issues. The climate change model explained a statistically significant portion of
the variance in political participation, F(4, 213) = 24.75, p < .001, R

2
Adjusted

= .31. Perceived
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severity of climate change (β = .18, p < .01), political self-efficacy (β = .33, p < .001),
and response efficacy (β = .18, p = .01) explained a significant portion of the variance in
political participation. Perceived susceptibility to climate change effects was not a
significant predictor of participation, therefore H2 was partially supported. See Table 5
for a full reporting of the variables in each model.
The social security model explained a statistically significant portion of the
variance in political participation, F(4, 213) = 17.01, p < .001, R

2
Adjusted

= .23, carried only

by political self-efficacy, β = .41, p < .001. Perceived severity of social security
insolvency, perceived susceptibility to the effects of social security insolvency, and social
security response efficacy were not significant predictors of political participation,
therefore H3 was partially supported.
A multiple regression was used to test whether perceptions of political parties
explain variance in political participation. The model explained a statistically significant
portion of the variance in participation, F(5, 190) = 11.39, p < .001, R

2
Adjusted

= .21. While

the model included polarization and positive and negative perceptions of both parties,
only negative perceptions of the Republican Party was significant, β = .37, p < .001,
therefore H4 was partially supported.
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Table 5.
Results of Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Political Participation
β

p

H1 Overall model
Political interest

.51

<.001

Internal political efficacy

.02

.736

External political efficacy

.04

.478

Civic duty

.21

<.001

H2 Overall model
Climate change severity

.18

.009

Climate change susceptibility

.08

.197

Political self-efficacy

.33

<.001

Climate change response efficacy

.18

.011

H3 Overall model
Social security severity

.06

.407

Social security susceptibility

.10

.095

Political self-efficacy

.41

<.001

Social security response efficacy

.10

.199

H4 Overall model
Polarization

.13

.116

Positive perception Democratic Party

.06

.492

Negative perception Democratic Party

.01

.897

Positive perception Republican Party

-.05

.506

Negative perception Republican Party .37
Note: Significant variables are emphasized in bold.

<.001

F

df

p

R

2
A

30.83 4, 213 <.001

.36

24.75 4, 213 <.001

.31

17.01 4, 213 <.001

.23

11.39 5, 190 <.001

.21

Two research questions were also posed, asking whether policy-centered risk
perception variables could explain additional variance in participation when controlling
for political variables. To investigate these questions, two hierarchical multiple
regressions were conducted with political participation as the dependent variable.
Political interest, civic duty, internal and external political efficacy entered
simultaneously in the first block (Model 1), and risk perception variables for each policy
issue were added in the second blocks. Model one predicted a significant portion of the
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variance in participation in both the climate change and social security models, F(4,212)
= 30.65, p < .001, R = .35. Adding risk and efficacy variables for climate change in the
2
A

second model further contributed to the explanation of variance in participation, F(4,
208) = 6.47, p < .001, R = .42. Climate change response efficacy (β = .17, p = .007) and
2
A

political self-efficacy (β = .13, p = .046) contributed significantly to the model, while
perceived severity and susceptibility for climate change did not.
Adding risk and efficacy perceptions for social security to political variables of
interest in the third model also contributed further to the explanation of variance in
participation, F(4, 208) = 3.91, p = .004, R = .39. However, of the four variables, only
2
A

political self-efficacy (β = .22, p = .001) was significant.
Table 6.
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses, RQ1 and RQ2
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

β

p

β

p

β

p

Political interest

.51

< .001

.36

< .001

.41

< .001

Civic duty

.21

.001

.15

.007

.18

.002

Internal political efficacy

.02

.737

.01

.821

-.01

.923

External political efficacy

.04

.479

.01

.895

.33

.574

Climate change severity

.07

.245

Climate change susceptibility

.05

.370

Climate change response
efficacy

.17

.007

Political self-efficacy

.13

.046

.22

.001

Social Security severity

-.03

.662

Social Security susceptibility

.05

.332

Social Security response
efficacy

.06

.401

F(4,212) = 30.65
p < .001
R = .35
Note: Significant variables are emphasized in bold.
Model Summary

2
A

F(4,208) = 6.47
p < .001
R = .42
2
A

F(4,208) = 3.91
p = .004
R = .39
2
A
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A third research question asked whether perceptions of political parties added to
the explanatory power of the political variables. To investigate this question, a
hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with political interest, civic duty, internal
and external political efficacy in the first block (Model 1; F/4,191 = 27.61, p < .001, R =
2
A

.35) and polarization, positive perceptions of each party and negative perceptions of each
party in the second block. The resulting fourth model contributed further to the
explanation of variance in participation, F(5,186) = 4.03, p = .002, R = .40. Of the
2
A

affective variables, only negative perceptions of the Republican Party (β = .26, p < .001)
was significant.
Table 7.
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses, RQ3
Model 1

Model 4

β

p

β

p

Political interest

.51

< .001

.44

< .001

Civic duty

.21

.001

.16

.009

Internal political efficacy

.02

.750

.04

.536

External political efficacy

.04

.502

.01

.931

Polarization

.08

.243

Positive perceptions of the Democratic Party

-.12

.168

Negative perceptions of the Democratic Party

-.12

.175

Positive perceptions of the Republican Party

.08

.299

Negative perceptions of the Republican Party

.26

< .001

Model Summary

F(4,191) = 27.61
p < .001
R = .35
2
A

Note: Significant variables are emphasized in bold.

F(5,186) = 4.03
p = .002
R = .40
2
A
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Discussion
The results of this study demonstrate that risk perceptions could help expand our
understanding of political participation. The participants in the present study reflect a
young, liberal demographic that aligns in many ways with Bennett’s (2008) idea of the
actualizing citizen. Understanding the perceptions and behavior of this group offers
valuable insight into the changing trends in political participation. A key limitation of this
study, however, is the use of a convenience sample. While participants in the present
study largely reflect a demographic that is becoming more active in politics (Cilluffo &
Fry, 2019; Fabina, 2021), probability sampling from a larger population is needed to
draw more firm conclusions. What this study can offer is a glimpse into possible fruitful
avenues of inquiry.
Political Variables
Of the four political variables tested, political interest contributes most to the
explanation of the variance in participation, followed by civic duty. This aligns with
previous research that suggests that interest is a necessary precursor to participation
(Blais, 2000; Blais & Daoust, 2020; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Prior, 2010).
Civic duty has long been associated with electoral participation (Blais, 2000; Riker and
Oldeshook, 1968) but recent trends have caused some scholars to question how well it
accounts for the political behavior of younger citizens (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells, &
Rank, 2009). The present study affirms its continued importance for this group.
Contrary to previous findings, neither internal nor external political efficacy were
significantly associated with political participation in this study. This lack of impact may
be due to the anemic scales. Consistent with other recent research in the United States,
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the present study used the measurement of political efficacy from the American National
Election Studies (ANES). Because these measures include only two questions each to
measure internal and external efficacy, internal reliability cannot be established. Though
the correlations between items were significant and moderate, future research should
return to the issues surrounding measurement of political efficacy. Given the persistent
significance of political self-efficacy in the models, the role of efficacy in political
participation should not be overlooked.
Policy Risk Perceptions
Political self-efficacy was included as one of four variables in the risk perception
models and explained a significant portion of the variance in participation in all of the
models to which it was added. The other variables in these two models were issuespecific measurements of participants’ perceptions of climate change and social security.
The Extended Parallel Process Model predicts adoption of the recommended behavior
when both threat and efficacy perceptions are high. Though the present study is crosssectional and cannot establish a causal link, these results suggest that the EPPM could be
applied to political behavior.
There was a notable difference between the two policy issue models. In the
climate change model, perceived severity, perceived response efficacy, and political selfefficacy were significantly associated with participation; in the social security model the
only significant variable was political self-efficacy, which was not issue-specific. It
appears that risk perceptions of social security did not impact political participation in the
present study. This is likely due to the life stage of the participants. While protecting
social security for use by future generations of Americans generally garners widespread

30
support (Dunlap & McCright, 2011), it may not be a relevant concern for college
students. It is also possible that issue-based participation is only significant for polarized
issues. While climate change elicits strong reactions from partisans on both sides of the
political spectrum, social security is a less controversial issue (Dunlap & McCright, 2011;
Hart & Feldman, 2016; Jamieson, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2019). This may impact
the degree to which it influences participation among political partisans. Future research
should investigate whether salient issues for different populations contribute differently
to their political behaviors.
When the issue-specific risk perception variables were added to the political
variables, climate change response efficacy was retained in the final model but not
perceived severity nor perceived susceptibility. This suggests that efficacy perceptions
may drive participation more than the perceived importance or personal relevance of even
salient policy issues.
Party Risk Perceptions
Record voter turnout in the 2018 midterm and 2020 presidential elections
reversed a decades-long downward trend in electoral participation (Campbell, 2006;
Norris, 2015; Persily & Stewart III, 2021). Public discourse during the campaigns
suggested that a driving force in electoral participation might be perceptions of a political
party as a risk. That is, an individual may be more motivated to vote in order to prevent
an unfavorable party from winning than to advance a favorable party. Rhetoric from both
Republicans and Democrats leading up to the 2020 presidential election framed their
political opponents as dangerous and frightening, and as a risk to the wellbeing of the
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country (e.g. Badger, 2020; Ball, 2016; Cilliza, 2020; Costa, Weigel, Sonmez, & Wagner,
2020). It is possible that these messages are related to the record-breaking turnout.
Of the affective polarization variables examined in the present study, negative
perceptions of the Republican Party explained the most variance in political participation.
By itself and coupled with political interest and civic duty, affective polarization—or the
magnitude of the difference between one’s feelings toward the Democratic and
Republican Parties—did explain a significant portion of the variance in participation but
the effect disappeared when other affective variables were added. In the present sample,
it seems that a driving affective force behind participation is negative perceptions of the
Republican Party. Because the participants in this study overwhelmingly leaned toward a
liberal political ideology and self-identified as aligning with the Democratic Party, these
results are perhaps not surprising. Future research should investigate whether the same
trends hold among more conservative populations. A key limitation of this study is that
the full complement of EPPM variables was not measured for affective polarization.
While negative perceptions of the parties could represent perceived threat, future research
should measure feelings of susceptibility to the “threat” of the outparty and should
include efficacy perceptions.
Implications
Taken together, these findings add to the literature in three ways. First, they
affirm the conclusions of previous research in political communication (Blais, 2000;
Blais & Daoust, 2020; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Prior, 2010). Political interest
and civic duty continue to be robustly associated with political participation. While some
have expressed concerns that younger citizens in particular may not be as motivated by
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civic duty, the present study suggests that it remains a relevant factor for participation.
Future research should continue to examine determinants of participation for younger
generations, and to support efforts to foster interest and civic duty in future generations of
citizens.
Second, the present study highlights the importance of self-efficacy for political
participation and calls for a renewed investigation into the conceptualization and
operationalization of the construct in political communication. While efficacy has long
been theorized to play a role in political participation (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954;
Craig, 1979; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991), the performance of internal and
(particularly) external political efficacy has been unstable in prior research (Acock &
Clarke, 1990; Caprara et al., 2009; Chamberlain, 2012). This may be due to inconsistent
measurement (Caprara et al., 2009; Chamberlain, 2012; Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990;
Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991), which limits the ability to meaningfully
compare results across studies.
This instability may also suggest that the evolution of the concept of efficacy
within the field has not kept pace with the development in other subfields such as risk
communication. Caprara et al. (2009) argue for a return to Bandura’s Social Cognitive
Theory to revitalize the concept. They use SCT to create a more robust measure of
political efficacy which asks whether participants feel capable of performing different
political behaviors. This aligns conceptually with internal efficacy, though some items on
the scale do incorporate elements of external efficacy. In the present study, their measure
of political self-efficacy was a significant predictor of participation in the linear models
and was retained in the stepwise models, while internal and external efficacy were not.
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The next best efficacy measure to predict political participation in the present study was
climate change response efficacy. Items on this response efficacy scale asked whether
participants believed that government action could make a difference for climate change.
This aligns more clearly with external political efficacy. It is possible that the original
ideas behind internal and external efficacy are still relevant, but the current measurement
instrument used in political communication has been diluted beyond usefulness. Future
research should take up this persistent issue, and may benefit from combining insights
from risk communication theory to fine tune the application of efficacy for politics.
Third, this study extends recent work on affective polarization that suggests that
participation could be motivated by fear of the outparty. While this indicates that
affective polarization has the potential to mobilize partisans (Stapleton, 2020), the cost
likely outweighs any benefit. Affective polarization is a growing concern among political
scholars, with projected deleterious consequences including decreased support for
bipartisanship (Levendusky, 2013), increased proliferation and acceptance of
misinformation (Garrett, Long, & Jeong, 2019), and non-political conflict among citizens
(Iyengar et al., 2019). In the present study negative perceptions of the Republican Party
emerged as the strongest affective predictor of participation, neutralizing the effect of
affective polarization. In other words, the degree of difference between in-party and outparty evaluations was less important than the strength of negative out-party perceptions.
While this lopsided result was likely due to the large portion of the sample that aligned
with liberal politics and the Democratic Party, future work should examine whether these
results are true for other populations, and should explore the relationship between
negative evaluations of the outparty and other important variables.
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Conclusion
This study draws on concepts from political and risk communication to inform
our understanding of what motivates people to be politically active. Inspired by concerns
that traditional models of participation do not perform as well among younger and more
diverse populations (e.g. Bennett, 2008), alternate variables are considered including risk
perceptions surrounding policy issues and political parties. Results show that established
political variables such as political interest and civic duty remain strongly associated with
participation, while offering support for several new variables of interest from the risk
communication literature. The present study explored risk and efficacy perceptions for
two policy issues, as well as political parties as a potential risk. Results show that threat
and efficacy perceptions for climate change and negative perceptions of the Republican
Party explained additional variance in political participation when added to known
predictors of participation. As scholars and practitioners look for factors that help explain
recent reversals in participation trends, risk communication offers perspectives worth
exploring. Bennett (2008) observes that our increasingly network-based society may
herald a shift to participatory behavior that aligns with or reflects individual identity and
self-interest. By exploring the contribution of individuals’ threat and efficacy perceptions
to explanations of variance in political participation, this study brings attention to the
worth of risk.
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Appendix: Demographic Regression
Table 8.
Results of Multiple Regression Analysis With Demographic Variables as the Determinants
β

t

p

Overall model
Age

-.96

-1.03

.303

Education Level

.10

1.13

.258

Ethnicity

.03

0.34

.736

Income

-.03

-0.38

.702

Sex

-.02

-0.31

.755

F

df

p

R

.384

5, 169

.859

-0.18
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